Using a panel dataset of firms for the period 1999-2008, we estimated the prevalence of zombies among Japanese Small-and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and their borrowing and investment behaviors. We observe that 4-14% of SMEs were zombie firms during the period 1999-2008.
Introduction
This paper explores the extent to which zombie SMEs existed in Japan and their borrowing and investment behavior using firm panel data. The dataset we use is a balanced dataset of non-consolidated financial statements of 4,090 SMEs from 1998 to 2008 that were edited by Tokyo Shoko Research.
Many studies have analyzed listed zombie firms in Japan, but far less research explores the existence of SME zombies in Japan. The misallocation of bank lending has been implicated in the ever-greening of loans. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) (hereafter, CHK) argue that the existence of zombie firms, that is, firms that should exit the market but continue to operate through bank assistance 1 , has negative effects on the firm performance, productivity and investment of healthy firms. CHK conclude that the existence of zombie firms is responsible for stagnation in the Japanese economy. Fukuda and Nakamura (2011) (hereafter, FN) argue that CHK include excellent firms in their definition of zombie firms. Thus, FN identify zombie firms using a unique method. Additionally, FN consider why most of these firms recovered and did not experience bankruptcy primarily using listed firm data. However, CHK and FN consider only listed firms.
However, the Japanese economy dominantly consists of SMEs rather than listed firms. The 99.7% of firms operated in non-primary industry is SMEs and the 62.7% of full-time workers are employed in SMEs in 2012.
2 Moreover, SMEs may have been more affected by the banking sector than listed firms because the SMEs mainly rely on bank loans and do not issue bonds.
Therefore, it is important to analyze how extensively the banking sector influenced SMEs. No research
has examined the emergence of ever-greening and zombie SMEs, using the analytical methods employed by CHK and FN. Moreover, very few studies estimate the borrowing and investment functions of SMEs using micro data. In particular, no research has shed light on the borrowing and investment behaviors of zombie SMEs. For these reasons, we examine the characteristics of zombie SMEs in Japan and their borrowing and investment behaviors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review previous research on the identification of zombie firms and borrowing and investment behaviors in Japan. In section 3, we estimate the extent to which zombie SMEs existed in Japan by modifying the methods developed by CHK and FN.
In section 4, we present our estimated model. In section 5, we present descriptive statistics, and in section 6, we report the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
A Literature Review of Zombie Firm Identification and their Behavior
In this section, we review the previous research that addresses the identification of zombie firms, ever-greening as well as the borrowing and investment behaviors of Japanese SMEs. Before addressing zombie identification using the method developed by FN, we identify zombie firms using the CHK method. The CHK criterion is defined as the minimum required interest payment for each firm each year, , * , as follows: 
Identification of Zombie Firms
where , −1 , , −1 , and , −1 represent short-term bank loans (less than one year), long-term bank loans (more than one year), and total bonds outstanding (including convertible bonds (CBs) and warrant-attached bonds), respectively, for firm i at the end of year t . Additionally, rs , , and min ( −4 , … , ) represent the average short-term prime rate in year t, average long-term prime rate in year t, and minimum observed coupon rate for convertible corporate bond issued over the last five years, respectively.
The CHK criterion compares the actual interest payments made by firm , with a hypothetical lower bound , * . The CHK criterion normalizes the interest payment difference using the total outstanding of borrowing at the beginning of the period, (B , −1 = , −1 + , −1 + , −1 + CP , −1 ), where CP , −1 represents the commercial paper outstanding for firm i at the beginning of period t, so that the units are comparable to the interest rate. Using the CHK criterion, the firm is considered zombie if
However, FN warn that high-performing firms that receive low interest rates might be considered zombies according to the CHK criterion. According to the FN, firms should satisfy both a profitability criterion and a financial support criterion in order to qualify as zombies.
The profitability criterion holds if the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 4 fall below the minimum required interest payment. The following basic concept underpins this criterion: if a firm cannot pay the minimum required interest, a firm is non-performing.
The financial support criterion holds if firms either satisfy the CHK criterion or can obtain new loans. If current year borrowing exceeds the previous year borrowing (with a threshold for long-term borrowing of 1 year), it implies that the firm was able to obtain new loans. When a firm cannot pay the minimum required interest payment or receives new loans, the firm experiences ever-greening.
FN state that the zombie ratio of listed firms decreases after 2005. However, only a few firms declared bankruptcy; therefore, most listed zombie firms recovered and became healthy firms 5 .
We basically identify zombie firms and estimate the zombie ratio using the methods developed by CHK and FN. However, the FN method is also inadequate because healthy firms that experience temporary 3 CHK use the long-term prime rate, short-term prime rate and coupon rate on convertible corporate bond on the previous fiscal year base. However, we use current year interest rates. As FN presume that CHK organize financial data and interest rates by calendar year, we organize the database by fiscal year. We then use these interest rates for the current year base period. 4 We calculate EBIT as follows: current profit + interest expense -interest income. 5 FN note that listed zombie firms recovered by downsizing employees and assets.
decreases in profits might be identified as zombies. We therefore devised an original zombie identification method (i.e., a modified FN method). This method is discussed in details in section 3.
We now describe the previous research that addresses ever-greening among SMEs. Fukuda et al. (2006) analyze whether ever-greening exists in unlisted Japanese firms and argue that ever-greening exists when the debt-asset ratio is greater than 3. They note that only a few firms exhibit debt-asset ratios greater than 3 and conclude that ever-greening seldom occurs among SMEs. Sakai et al. (2010) conclude that no unnatural selection or ever-greening occurs among SMEs because the expected borrowing cost of surviving firms falls below that of the exiting firms and the expected ROA of the surviving firms exceeds that of the exiting firms.
However, Fukuda et al. (2006) consider only the profit rate and debt-asset ratio of the borrowing firms and do not consider other firm characteristics. Moreover, they do not identify firms as zombies or non-zombies.
While Sakai et al. (2010) Therefore, it is important to identify zombie SMEs directly using their financial statements.
Borrowing and Investment Behaviors of SMEs
In this section, we review the previous research that addresses the borrowing and investment behavior of SMEs during the recent years in Japan.
A considerable amount of research addresses recent firm investment in Japan. However, no research investigates recent borrowing and investment behaviors among SMEs from the viewpoint of changes in bank lending, and the soft budget problem. We take account of the bank's capital adequacy ratio and ratio of nonperforming loans to proxy for bank soundness, which intrinsically affects the behavior of their client firms through bank lending. Ogawa (2003) estimates the firm investment function using firm micro data, and he indicates that bank willingness to lend affected firm investment significantly and that the severe lending attitudes of financial institutions deterred investment among small firms. However, the measure of bank willingness to lend is not constructed from micro data and cannot represent individual banks' willingness to lend.
In a subsequent study, Ogawa (2008) uses micro data and indicates that a bank nonperforming loan ratio negatively affects lending attitudes toward their client SMEs and subsequently the rate of change in fixed tangible assets of their client SMEs. However, this study did not utilize the change or changing rate of bank lending to client firms. Fukuda et al. (2007) estimate investment function for SMEs using recent micro data. They use the capital adequacy ratio and nonperforming loans ratio of the firms' main banks and conclude that the soundness of the banks affected client investment. However, these authors do not consider changes in bank lending.
These studies indicate that a capital crunch occurred and it decreased recent investment, especially among SMEs. Bank financial health and firm land values affected firm investment through the lending of their main banks. However, these investigations did not consider change or changing rate of bank lending directly for recent years in Japan using SME micro data. Bank soundness would have affected their client firms through bank lending. Therefore, it is important to estimate the borrowing and investment functions, including the change in bank lending, using SME micro data.
The Identification of Zombie SMEs
Before estimating the borrowing and investment functions, we first estimate the number of zombie SMEs in Japan. We identify zombie firms using both the CHK and FN criteria. If we use only the FN criteria, we might mistakenly identify non-zombie firms as zombie firms if the non-zombie firms experienced temporary profit decreases 6 . Similarly, we might mistakenly identify zombie firms as non-zombie firms if the zombie firms experienced temporary profit increases.
Therefore, we use the following modified FN profit criterion to identify zombie firms (.i.e., we do not change the FN financial support criterion in this paper).
Where the firms satisfy the following dynamic condition, we say that the firms satisfy the modified FN profit criterion:
Note that when T equals 0, this condition corresponds to the FN profit criterion.
If firms satisfy the modified FN profit and financial support criteria (the CHK criterion that the actual interest payment falls below the theoretical minimum interest payment or that the firm can obtain a new loan), we consider them zombies. In so doing, we excluded firms that capitalized more than 10 billion yen to focus on SME zombies.
We identify zombie firms by the CHK, FN and modified FN with T=1-9 criterion, respectively and then calculate the zombie ratios. The results are displayed in Table 1 . Using the CHK criterion, between 30-40% of SMEs are zombie firms. Using the FN criteria, we regard approximately 14% of firms as zombies in 1999 and thereafter the zombie ratio exhibits a downward trend. Moreover, the zombie ratios after T=3
hovers around 4-7% stably. Therefore, when SMEs satisfy both modified FN profit criterion for T=3 and the financial support criterion, we consider these SMEs to be zombie firms by modified FN criterion 7 .
Judging from the proportion of zombie firms in Table 1 , we can confirm that between 4-7% of SMEs were zombies even if we estimate zombie firms conservatively. This result is quite different from the previous studies, which reported that there were only a few zombie firms among SMEs. Additionally, the zombie ratio of SMEs capitalized at between 100 million 1 billion yen is in the range of 4-7%. These ratios are relatively low and have similar values. In addition, using the modified FN criteria, the zombie ratio of firms capitalized at more than 1 billion yen is in the range of 5-13%. The zombie ratio for these large firms is relatively high.
Interestingly, the results above indicate that ever-greening occurred even in SMEs. Therefore, it suggests that the Regional Banks, Second Association of Regional Banks, Sinkin Banks and Credit Unions, known as regional financial agencies, may have protected their client firms. Moreover, the credit-guarantee system (Sinyo Hosho Seido) of local governments would have protected regional SMEs. Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) note that the Japanese government required banks receiving public capital to increase lending to SMEs. This forced lending may have increased non-performing loans. A white paper on SMEs in Japan (1999) observed that smaller firms faced more permissive lending in 1998 as a Japanese government took countermeasures against the credit crunch. This policy might explain why many SMEs capitalized at less than 10 million yen are identified as zombies.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the zombie ratios by equity capital using the FN criteria and modified FN criteria, respectively. Many zombie firms existed in the finance and real estate industries. The figures hint that disposition of non-performing loans did not progress in these industries. The zombie ratio in the finance industry increased after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. However, the zombie ratio in the construction industry is relatively low. It seems that in the construction sector, banks bankrupted many non-performing firms, and ever-greening did not occur. Moreover, we also observe high zombie ratios in other industries.
These industries exhibit zombie ratios in the range of 3-12%, which decrease over time, as indicated in Note that the zombie ratio is extremely high in March 1999, as indicated in Figures 1 and 3 . The special credit-guarantee system, established for saving troubled SMEs, might have temporarily increased the number of zombie firms 8 . The special credit-guarantee system was accessed on over 1,720,000 occasions for a total of 29 trillion yen. Matsuura and Hori (2003) demonstrated that firms that used the special credit-guarantee system tended to suffer from excessive debt and low profits. Many of these firms might be identified as zombies 9 . The zombie ratio exhibits a downward trend until 2007, which indicates that many zombie firms eventually became healthy firms.
There is a caveat in interpreting our results. Our dataset is a balanced panel consisting of surviving firms, so that these data do not include failed firms by definition, which were likely zombie firms prior to bankruptcy 10 . A dataset that included failed firms would have enabled us to analyze why banks protect rather than bankrupt their non-performing clients. If the information of whether firms had used the special credit-guarantee system were available, we could estimate the effect of this policy measure on zombie ratio and bankruptcies.
Models of Borrowing and Investment Behaviors of SMEs
To investigate the borrowing and investment behaviors of SMEs, notably zombie SMEs, we estimate the following borrowing and investment equations, separately for all firms, FN zombie firms and modified FN zombie firms.
Specification of Borrowing Function
The borrowing function to be estimated is specified as follows:
where , is the sum of the real value of long-term and short-term borrowing. We include the land-borrowing ratio as one of the explanatory variables because firm land is often used as collateral when firms borrow from banks, especially in SME financing. 13 Land collateral mitigates asymmetric information between firms and banks. Therefore we expect the sign of 4 to be positive for all firms. However, we expect that 4 is negative or statistically insignificant for zombie firms because a decrease in the collateral value might cause a soft budget problem. According to Berglof and Roland (1997) , hard budget constraint equilibrium occurs when collateral value exceeds net verifiable returns from refinancing. On the other hand, when collateral value falls below net verifiable return refinancing, the bank has no incentive to activate the client and refinance a poor project.
We expect that 1 is positive because firms require borrowing to expand their economic activities. We expect that 2 is negative. When an asymmetric information problem exists, the internal financing cost will be lower than the external financing cost. Hence, the firms would raise the funds internally rather than borrowing from banks.
Comparison of the value of 3 between all firms and zombie firms might be interesting because it corresponds to the comparison of the severity of over-leveraging between the entire sample and zombie firms.
11 We use total borrowing rather than bank borrowing since the latter figure is not available in our dataset of SMEs. 12 Details on the construction of capital adequacy ratios and NPL ratios on prefecture basis are provided in Appendix 3. 13 Appendix 2 shows the procedure to calculate land value.
Specification of Investment Function
Now we turn to estimation of the marginal q-type investment function specified as follows: 
where , , , , , , and , are investment, capital stock, marginal q and cash flow, respectively 14 .
We calculated , as follows. We assumed that the discount rates and profit rates of the firm follow the random walk.
, +1 = , + , +1
where , , and , , are the profit rates and discount rates, respectively, and , +1 and , +1 represent stationary white noise. The discount rate was calculated by dividing the interest paid and the discount on note by the outstanding of long-and short-term borrowing, bonds and discount bills at the end of previous year. The profit rate was calculated by dividing the operating profit by the capital stock at the end of previous year.
Given the above assumptions, , is expressed as follows:
where δ and represent the capital depreciation rate, which is also used to construct capital stock series as reported by Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and the investment goods deflator reported by the Bank of Japan. The marginal q and cash flows for all firms and zombie firms are very different. The marginal q and cash flow of zombie firms are lower than those of all firms. In particular, the marginal q and cash flow of FN zombie firms are extremely low. It might reflect our definistion of zombie firms because we imposed a profit criterion on zombie firms and marginal q and cash flow are calculated from the operating profit. In particular, FN zombie firms are considered zombie firms when their EBIT is under the minimum required interest payment even for only one year, in which case, the low profit firms are most likely concentrated within FN zombie firms.
Estimation Results
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We imposed a profit criterion on zombie firms, and thus , , −1 ⁄ of zombie firms are low.
We provide the estimation results of the borrowing function in As for the coefficient of
, it is positive and significant at the 5% level for all firms, while it is insignificant for FN and modified FN zombies. These results demonstrate that decreases in the value of land collateral reduced borrowing from banks among healthy firms 16 . Note that the land-borrowing ratios of zombie firms are lower than those of all firms. These results for the zombies support the soft budget hypothesis proposed by Berglof and Roland (1997) . The value of land collateral for non-performing firms decreased, and the liquidation value decreased, so that their lenders could not recover a profit by selling the land collateral. The banks therefore had no incentive to bankrupt firms. If the soft budget hypothesis is held, the value of land collateral of bankrupt firms, which is not included in our dataset, increases. As these liquidation values increased, banks could eliminate non-performing loans and gained profits by selling the land. Therefore, we could not obtain a significant coefficient of land-borrowing ratio for FN and modified FN zombies.
In For all firms, the coefficients of marginal q and cash flow are positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of cash flows are also significant and positive for FN and modified FN zombie firms.
As for the effect of debt-asset ratio on investment, the effects are mixed. The coefficient of the debt-asset ratio is insignificant for FN zombies, while it is positive and significant for all firms and modified FN zombies. The absolute value of the coefficient is much larger for modified FN zombies and it suggests that modified FN zombie firms aggressively allocated debt to investment.
Concluding Remarks
We estimated the extent to which zombie SMEs existed in Japan and examined their borrowing and investment behavior using balanced panel data of SMEs edited by Tokyo Shoko Research.
We confirm that many zombie firms existed among SMEs, especially among firms capitalized at less than 10 million yen at a modest estimate. One reason for this observation may be that regional financial agencies and local government credit-guarantee systems (Sinyo Hosho Seido) protected non-performing SMEs in each region.
Furthermore, recent decreases in land values induced a credit crunch in healthy firms. However, this crunch did not lead to a decrease of borrowing among zombie firms. This result suggests that the ever-greening of zombie firms was prevalent. Moreover, the credit crunch reduced productive or profitable investment among healthy firms, while ever-greening induced non-productive and non-profitable investment among zombie firms.
Given these results, it is a task for economists to analyze how ever-greening among zombie firms affected their productivity compared to the productivity of healthy firms 19 . In particular, we should investigate the determinants of the productivity of zombie firms. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) claim that the productivity of the Japanese economy slowed down during the lost decade. This slowdown might be attributable to non-efficient investment induced by ever-greening and zombie SMEs.
If we could obtain data from bankrupt firms and identify each firm's major lenders, we could analyze why banks protected zombie firms or bankrupted non-performing firms. In addition, we would be able to calculate the zombie ratio of SMEs by incorporating the bankrupt incidents of SMEs. It would be important to account for the factors, such as the credit-guarantee system (Sinyo Hosho Seido), bank type, bank 17 According to FN criterion firms that experienced temporarily low profits and were otherwise healthy are classified as zombie firms, so that a low marginal q might be correlated with high investment for FN zombies. 18 One might cast doubt on the reliability of computed marginal q for FN zombie firms because they reflect temporarily low evaluation. However, we excluded firms that experienced temporary losses from the modified FN zombie category. Therefore, the criticism above on marginal q is not held for the modified FN zombie. 19 Ahearne and Shinada (2005) state that total borrowing in the non-traded goods sectors, such as construction, retail and wholesale, rose sharply during the 1990s and these sectors experienced low productivity growth. They conclude that ever-greening of zombie firms in non-traded goods sectors induced low productivity growth. However, they did not identify zombie firms from financial statements.
soundness, and trade terms with main lenders. Moreover, if the soft budget theory is held, fall of land value induced ever-greening. Thus, land values determine the choice of ever-greening or bankruptcy. It is one of the policy goals that regional financial agencies and governments protect local client firms to support regional economies 20 . Exploration into the banks' decision to bankrupt or ever-greening client SMEs is our future avenue for research.
Appendices Appendix 1. Construction of Investment and Capital Stock Series
We calculated investment series as follows. First, we calculated the real capital stock by dividing the capital stock by the capital goods deflator. Capital goods deflators are included in the "Index by Stage of Demand and Use" published by the Bank of Japan. We represent capital stock as .
Second, we compute as follows:
where CIP represents construction in progress and Dep represents depreciation.
Finally, we obtained the capital stock series following the perpetual inventory method:
where is the depreciation rate reported by Hayashi and Inoue (1991) . Benchmark stock is the capital stock in 1998.
Appendix 2. Construction of Land Stock Series
We calculated the current value of land from book values of land as follows. First, we estimated the book values of land per representative firm for four groups categorized by equity capital, using Surveys for the Third, we evaluated the current book value ratio for each firm group as:
current book value ratio = Finally, we calculated each firm's land assets at current value by multiplying each firm's book value of land by the current book value ratio above.
Appendix 3 Construction of the Capital Adequacy Ratio and
Non-Performing Loan Ratio by Prefecture
We calculated a measure for capital adequacy ratio and non-performing loan ratio of the Regional Banks (RB) and Second Association of Regional Banks (SARB) by prefecture.
We calculated each prefecture's capital adequacy ratio as follows:
capital adequacy ratio by prefecture =
where i is the bank, t is the year and n is the number of RBs and SARBs in each prefecture. The is 8% when the bank is a bank operating international business. The is 4% when the bank is operating domestic business only.
We calculate each prefecture's non-performing loan ratio as follows:. A is a risk-management loan. Prob >chi2 =0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0006 *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1% ⊿Borrowing/Asset,t-1 Instruments: ⊿lnS π /Asset,t-1 Land,t-1/Borrow,t-1 BankCap,t-1 BankNPL,ｔ-1 ⊿lnS,t-1 π ,t-1/Asset,t-2 Land,t-2/Borrow,t-2 BankCap,t-2 BankNPL,ｔ-2 a time lag of 1 of explanetary variables *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%
